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Anglo-American trial procedure has traditionally been labeled as "ad-
versary," in contrast to the "inquisitorial" trial procedures employed on the
European continent. Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis, which
is the joint effort of two distinguished scholars-a social psychologist and a
law professor-is a bold attempt to determine which of these two systems
better serves the purposes of justice. It describes and analyzes a series of
laboratory experiments designed to compare "adversary" and "inquisito-
rial" procedures with respect to their actual and perceived ability to obtain
and transmit unbiased information.
The thread which links the studies of the book's three sections is the
role of a third party in dispute settlement. The first set of studies focuses on
the extent to which a third party should be the decisionmaker; the remaining
studies assume a third party to be the final decisionmaker and examine his
role as an information gatherer and appraiser under a variety of controlled
conditions. The skill of the authors is reflected consistently in the ingenuity
of their manipulations and in the care of their controls. Perhaps even more
impressive is the pioneering nature of their effort, in that they have empiric-
ally explored an area that so far has received little attention. In so doing, the
book employs the strength of controlled research to dissect the complex
variables of procedural justice and identify their critical components. The
authors have also used relevant psychological theory and legal literature in
the development of their research, showing a breadth of research that has not
generally characterized previous efforts by social scientists in the study of
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legal structures. 1 With a final touch of sophistication, the authors, recogniz-
ing that cultural norms may determine preferences in conflict resolution,
have conducted replications of their experiments in France, Germany and
England.
While the book seeks to inform a dual audience, the effort is not always
successful. The social scientist misses tables and graphs, and occasionally a
better understanding of the law, while the legal scholar may need a more
complete description of experimental procedures. The authors note this
problem and point out that the studies were published in more complete
form elsewhere; 2 nevertheless, the omissions occasionally are troublesome.
This problem is one that is probably common to most of the emerging law
and social science literature, but in light of the mutual educative function
such writing can serve, redundancy is to be preferred.
The book's first study (chapter two) examines the preferences of
litigants for various degrees of third party participation in conflict resolution
in the following situations: with and without time pressure for a decision, in
the presence or absence of a standard resolution scheme and when the
participants were in individual competition or were interdependent. Greater
third party control was preferred when there was time pressure, when a
standard existed and when participants were in competition rather than
interdependent. 3 Results of this first study are presented verbally rather than
in numerical form, however, which makes it difficult for the reader to order
the statistical results. In view of this problem, the authors decided wisely to
alter this form of presentation in chapter three; indeed, all the other studies
contain tables or graphs. The preference for greater third party control where
the participants have clearly opposing interests was again indicated by a
study in chapter three, where a hypothetical contract dispute was used.4 In
addition, mediation (low third party control) was shown here to be less
successful in producing settlements where clearly opposing interests are
involved than when disputants had more compatible outcome preferences. s
The experimental results of these first two studies suggest that litigants
will prefer a third party decisionmaker when party interests are competitive.
These outcomes are used to set the stage for the ensuing focus on third party
decisionmaking in the conflict-permeated territory of litigation. The intend-
ed implication is that third party control is justified by the preferences and
1. The research reported in PROCEDURAL JUSTICE was supported mainly by a grant from
the Law and Social Sciences Program of the National Science Foundation. The program
encourages interdisciplinary work through its funding of scientific research on law and legal
institutions.
2. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 6 n. i.
3. Id. 15.
4. Id. 20.
5. Id. 21.
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needs of the litigants. The legal reader may be mystified by this orientation,
however, in view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of legal cases
involving competitive interests are settled before trial, many without even
informal mediation by a judge. The explanation for this apparent paradox is
that the rules of the experiment prohibited compromise, the means by which
litigant settlement is generally achieved. The authors acknowledge that this
prohibition may have reduced the correspondence between their experimen-
tal arrangements and the typical bargaining situation, but are apparently
satisfied that the deviation is not serious. One ought to be more skeptical.
Without allowing bargaining and compromise, the first section (chapters
two and three) contributes little to an understanding of the procedures
available for resolving conflicts that lead to litigation-the primary focus of
the book.
The experiments discussed in the following four chapters simulated the
trial framework of the legal system in order to examine the various roles that
can be played by the decisionmaker and the presenters of information.
Chapters five and six show this type of research at its best. In chapter five,
subjects were assigned to a court- or client-centered role by being told either
that their financial reward was dependent on their helping the judge to arrive
at "as fair and accurate a decision as possible" 6 (a court-centered role) or on
obtaining a favorable outcome for their client (a client-centered role). These
rewards were simulated through a point system. The participants were also
told which role their opposing counsel had assumed. Finally, as they
"bought" facts in the case with "points" they had been given (which
decreased their compensation), subjects were allowed to discover that twen-
ty-five, fifty or seventy-five percent of the facts favored their side. The
authors found first, that client-centered attorneys purchased more facts than
court-centered attorneys when only twenty-five percent of the facts favored
their client,7 second, that bias in presentation was higher for client-centered
than for court-centered attorneys,8 and third, that representation bias by
client-centered attorneys was lower when they faced a client-centered attor-
ney than when they faced a court-centered attorney. 9
The authors assert that these experimental results indicate that the
client-centered attorney faced with an early unfavorable picture makes a
more thorough search for facts. 0 The typical civil attorney or overburdened
public defender, however, unlike the experimental subject, has not one but
many cases. Will the attorney increase the diligence, of his search for
6. Id. 31.
7. Id.
8. Id. 33-34.
9. Id. 34.
10. Id. 34, 38-39.
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favorable facts in an unpromising case? Or will he turn his attention to other
cases he has a better chance of winning and try in the difficult case for a
good plea bargain or settlement? The subject in this laboratory study was
faced with a single case on which to succeed or fail. He may react differ-
ently to the likely prospect of failure if confronted with a multitude of cases
with varying probabilities of success. One can easily imagine a study in
which an attorney-subject is assigned a series of cases and his reactions to an
early unfavorable distribution of facts are assessed against this background.
It is therefore the design and not the laboratory method that impeaches the
finding.
A second result of the research is the finding that evidence presented by
the client-centered attorney is less biased when he is confronted with another
client-centered attorney, rather than by a court-centered attorney. The au-
thors suggest that higher motivation by the client-centered attorney causes
him to misinterpret his facts, seeing them in a more favorable light than is
warranted.11 It could also be, however, that the client-centered attorney
assumes that an opposing client-centered attorney will be more likely to
bring out those facts-and that the facts will not cause as unfavorable a
reaction or be given as much weight if they are admitted at the outset.
Criminal defense attorneys often behave this way in front of juries, frequent-
ly quizzing their client on his criminal record under direct examination
before opposing counsel has the opportunity to cause its disclosure.
In chapter six the authors devised a clever means to investigate the
impact of pre-trial bias on decisionmaking in the adversary versus inquisito-
rial modes. Pre-trial bias was introduced in half of their subjects by reading
to them a series of cases which indicated that in the majority of instances the
action under discussion was unlawful. The decisionmakers were then pre-
sented with fifty brief factual statements concerning the case they were to
decide, twenty-five indicating that the action was lawful and the other
twenty-five indicating that the action was unlawful. The order of presenta-
tion (lawful-unlawful or unlawful-lawful) was also varied, and half the
subjects received all facts from a single presenter (inquisitorial) while the
other half received the lawful facts from a defense presenter and the
unlawful facts from a prosecution presenter (adversary). In addition to
finding that the bias condition generally produced more guilty verdicts 12 and
that whoever presented his case last had the greater impact ("recency
effect"),13 the authors discovered that the bias condition had a greater effect
when subjects heard the evidence in an inquisitorial mode than in an
11. Id. 34.
12. Id. 46.
13. Id. 45, 51.
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* adversary mode. 4 This interesting finding suggests that the decisionmaker's
expectation of bias on the part of adversaries may lead him to discount the
presented information. In an inquisitorial system, attributing balance to the
information-presenter may leave the decisionmaker less critical and more
ready to accept the parties' assertions.
The authors seem to consider this the most important study in the book,
since it offers, in their view, empirical support for the claims made for the
adversary system by legal scholars like Professor Lon Fuller.15 Moreover,
the findings are consistent with the psychological theories of reactance 16 and
attribution.17 Chapter seven, which examines the effects of changes in the
sequence of evidence presentation (weak to strong or strong to weak) and
gross order (defense or prosecution first), provides further support for some
of the conclusions found in chapter six. 18
The book's final section assesses the perceptions of participants in the
legal process, since the impression of justice is almost as important as
justice itself. The study discussed in chapter eight concerns a hypothetical
case in which the participants were accused of illegal business espionage.
They were either led to believe they were guilty or innocent, or not advised
as to their culpability at all. They were then tried under an adversary or
inquisitorial system and a guilty or not guilty verdict was reached. Partici-
pants and observers were later asked questions about their satisfaction with
the proceedings and their perceptions of the procedure's fairness. Both
participants and observers indicated that they favored the adversary mode of
trial. 19
A second study in this chapter found that the college student subjects,
regardless of whether they were from the United States, England, France or
Germany, all preferred the adversary mode of evidence presentation when
given the choice of an inquisitorial, single investigator, double investigator
or adversary system. 20 Such a preference by residents of countries not using
an adversary system is impressive.
Chapter nine attempts to identify the qualities of the adversary system
responsible for its appeal in earlier studies. Three elements are identified:
first, two attorneys are involved instead of one; second, the attorney is
14. Id. 49.
15. Id.; Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (H. Berman ed.
1961).
16. See generally J. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966).
17. See generally Jones & Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in
Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219 (L. Berkowitz
ed. 1965).
18. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 61.
19. Id. 73-74.
20. Id. 78-80.
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aligned with the client rather than the adjudicator; and third, the attorney is
chosen by the client rather than by the adjudicator.2 For participants,
addition of any of the above elements caused an equal increase in satisfac-
tion. 22 For observers, the only increase was caused by the presence of two
attorneys; alignment and selection had no further impact on them.23
The study discussed in chapter ten focuses on the role of the judge in an
adversary mode by having him assume either a very active or a very passive
posture. While the authors expected that participants would report less
control over the procedure when confronting an active judge, it was instead
discovered that such a condition had no impact on perceptions of justice. 24
A suggestion by philosopher John Rawls25 forms the basis for an
evaluation of the preferences for various procedural systems, a study which
is discussed in chapter eleven. Rawls defined principles of justice as those
standards that are preferred by disinterested participants who do not know
their own advantages and disadvantages, who' are shielded by a "veil of
ignorance" from having their sense of fairness colored by their own oppor-
tunity for gain.26 The authors indicate in this study that the adversary mode
is preferred by subjects assigned to either side, as well as by those who do
not yet know to which side they will be assigned.27
The last chapter, chapter twelve, reviews the authors' overall findings
and emphasizes their belief that at the heart of questions about procedural
justice is the concern for distribution of control between the decisionmaker
and the disputants.28 They conclude with a few illustrations of how their
findings might be applied: for example, their findings would support the use
of adversarial proceedings in disputed federal disability benefit programs
and in hearings on teacher dismissals and student suspensions. 29 The results
of their studies are also offered as justification for criticism of procedural
rules extending judicial control over litigants. 30 It is in an evaluation of these
suggestions for practical application, however, as is often the case with
simulated laboratory studies, that the major criticism of the book emerges
most clearly. The comparison of laboratory experiments involving college
students to the functioning of the real legal world is often strained, and
hence can lead to distortions.
21. Id. 82.
22. Id. 94.
23. Id. 95.
24. Id. 100-01.
25. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
26. Id. 136.
27. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 113-15.
28. Id. 119.
29. Id. 122-23.
30. Id. 123-24.
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The findings of the third section's experiments where the perceived
justice of various legal procedures was tested, hinge on the ability of the
student participants and observers to represent the more heterogeneous
group of adult citizens. But do the two groups respond in the same fashion?
Might not the college-educated group be less willing to give substantial
decisionmaking power to a third party? The reader is therefore left wonder-
ing whether the findings presented here and in the rest of the book could be
replicated with other subjects. To some extent this question can be raised in
most controlled social science research, but where the intention is to draw
conclusions about procedures that affect a broad constituency, the need for
replication with more representative subjects should be stressed.
The authors believe that the confluence of their experimental findings
indicates the superiority of the Anglo-American over the continental Euro-
pean system, and it is here that our major reservation lies. To achieve a
differential outcome, the authors have contrasted versions of "adversary"
and "inquisitorial" modes that differ more than the reality they were
designed to stimulate.
The so-called inquisitorial system has of course nothing to do with the
inquisition to which it has been linked linguistically. 31 As a matter of fact,
the European system is basically adversary; in the criminal courts, prosecu-
tion and defense counsel oppose each other, and in the civil courts plaintiffs
and defendants contest the issues with the help of their lawyers. In both the
adversary and inquisitorial systems it is primarily the lawyers who suggest
what evidence is to be presented and in both the judge has the ultimate
power to admit or refuse the offered evidence. The difference in the mode of
questioning, however, is greater: in the adversary system the lawyers do
almost all the questioning, and under inquisitorial procedure the judge does
most of it. Once the judge has finished, however, the lawyers always have
the right to ask additional questions. In addition, even in the adversary
system a strong judge, at crucial points, will occasionally inject himself into
the questioning. Therefore, the inquisitorial mode in the experiment occa-
sionally reaches extremes that are only parodies of the real world, such as
31. The derogatory "inquisitional" label probably derives from the universally accepted
rule that the criminal trial begins with the examination of the defendant, who is just that, and
not a witness. The charges or the indictment are read to the defendant by the judge, who first
asks him whether he pleads guilty to these charges; then, depending on how he pleads, the judge
continues the examination by probing into the alleged details of the critical events. As a rule,
the defendant will answer these questions, but if he prefers to remain silent, he cannot be
forced to talk and the court is entitled to draw its conclusions from such silence. The great or
the small difference, then, is that an American court or jury is not entitled to such a conclusion
but no way has yet been found to ban it effectively from their minds. Cf. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 179, 215 (1966) (analysis of effect upon juries of defendant's prior
criminal record and decision to testify).
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the judge who receives information only through questioning the parties and
decides when he has all the facts necessary to reach a decision.
In summary, then, the differences between the two systems in opera-
tion are actually moderate, especially if we compare the European system
with court proceedings before our more active and courageous judges, who
far from being inactive umpires, are in firm control of the proceedings.
Under these circumstances, the victory of the adversary mode in the experi-
ment can hardly help us to decide which of the two modes as they are used in
the real world is superior, 32 especially when a point somewhere between the
extremes might provide the optimal solution.33
32. This confusion over the appropriate level of variables is referred to as the problem of
"construct validity." See Cook & Campbell, The Design and Conduct of Quasi-Experiments
and True Experiments in Field Settings, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (M.
Dunette ed. 1976).
33. Cf. Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 465 (1976) (judges should actively
participate in adversary proceedings).
